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Abstract 

The critiques of power inequalities in MSIs predominantly focus on the domination of trans-national corporations in the process of negotiation, owing to information asymmetry and resource and capacity differentials. To challenge their influences, some MSI protagonists, under the influence of institutional thinking, proposes ‘anti-firm’ strategies, such as stronger sanction, more effective monitoring, and developing strategic alliance among non-market stakeholders, in an attempt to redraw the balance of power. By evaluating the effectiveness of the ‘anti-firm’ proposals, this paper argues that targeting trans-national corporations as the villain would simply create a dichotomy of ‘them versus us’. This perspective shows an inadequate understanding of the complex incentive structures of different stakeholders. Preoccupied with the power dynamics within MSIs, other wider dimensions of power inequalities, such as North-South tension, global-local dilemmas, and the legitimacy of non-governmental organisations in MSIs, are all side-stepped. 

1 Introduction 

Accusing multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) for being power-blind may sound ironic. The emergence of MSIs in the late 1980s was driven by concerns over asymmetrical power relationships among trans-national corporations, the state and citizens (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). In the light of market liberalisation, rising globalisation and governments’ weakening regulatory capacities, worries over the negative impact of global commodity chains on environment and labour rights led to a search for a multi-actor, collaborative and non-state solution to hold trans-national corporations accountable to their business practices, while simultaneously empowering local producers and consumers in the process of negotiation (Vallejo and Hauselmann, 2004; Utting, 2002). From the Forest Stewardship Council in 1993 to the Water Roundtable in 2010, numerous certifications, standards, codes of conducts and product-labelling have been globally applied in areas, such as natural resources, agricultural commodities and labour rights. MSIs are considered a ‘win-win’ governance framework that promote co-operation among business, smallholders, non-governmental organisations and trade unions (Perez-Ramirez et al., 2012). The model has, therefore, been ‘increasingly exported to developing countries as an example of good governance’ (Faysse, 2006:219). 

The rising popularity and increasing formalisation of MSIs has, however, caused MSIs to fall into a power trap. Kabeer (2001) challenges MSIs for inherently being a top-down, one-size-fits-all model, which is a-political, a-historical and de-contextualised (p16).  Increasing pressure to reach agreement results in ‘gloss[ing] over dissenting views’ within MSIs and muddling up means and end (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001:244). Another criticism of MSIs is their over-romanticising of power sharing in stakeholder politics. Placing too much emphasis on technical solutions, Truex and Soreide (2011) warn that MSIs are vulnerable to elite capture and corruption. 

While these criticisms are useful in raising the power sensitivity of MSIs, the search for the underlying causes of uneven power relationships has been misplaced. MSI literature tends to single out trans-national corporations for hijacking the process of negotiation by refusing to disclose information and by making monitoring and enforcement difficult (Soreide and Truex, 2011; Utting, 2002). To address the ‘firm-centric’ governance problems, proposals have been put forward to reform MSIs by imposing stronger sanctions and developing strategic alliance with non-market stakeholders, such as NGOs and unions (Martens, 2007).

Based on an intensive review of MSI literature and drawing on critical theories of institutions, power and corruption, this paper will argue that re-strengthening measures show an inadequate understanding of power dynamics, both within and without, MSIs. Making a dichotomy of ‘them versus us’ fails to understand the complex incentives of different stakeholders in the process of negotiation. The governance reforms also risk sidestepping other forms of power inequalities embedded in MSIs, such as the legitimacy of non-governmental organisations and the North-South power relations. 

This paper will first draw on MSI literature to outline the reasons for, and the impact of, the domination of trans-national corporations within MSIs. It will then discuss ‘anti-firm’ governance reforms in an attempt to address the power imbalance within MSIs. Using the ‘institution-actor-power’ nexus to conceptualise the debate, the paper will highlight the limitations of the ‘anti-firm’ perspective and will underline other forms of power inequalities hidden in MSIs. 

Acknowledging the diversity of MSIs, in terms of forms, scope and process of implementation (O’Rourke, 2006), the generalised claims we make in this paper may, therefore, not be completely relevant to a specific MSI set-up.

2 MSIs as firm-centric governance 

O’Rourke (2006) offers a key criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of MSIs: whether all key stakeholders feel equally involved throughout the processes of MSIs, from standard setting, monitoring to enforcement (p912).  Literature tends to single out trans-national corporations for their tendency to manipulate standard setting and to refuse disclosing information which makes effective monitoring and enforcement difficult. Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) warns that MSIs have become ‘firm-centric governance’ (p211). Utting (2002) makes his complaints to trans-national corporations more explicit: 

‘Large global corporations will always commit social and environmental sins: they are under pressure to cut costs and cut corners; by their very nature they need to exploit human and natural resources; and they are bureaucracies and corporate cultures that are difficult to change’ (p17, our emphasis). 

The motivations for trans-national corporations to partake in MSIs are often discredited. They are often considered opportunistic and insecure in their engagement. Being profit-seeking organisations, big companies are accused of using MSIs as a way to enhance their public image and to seek social recognition. Their involvement in MSIs, Rasche (2012) suggests, helps private corporations claim to be socially-responsible. Meeting the social expectations would reduce public resistance, beat rival firms, and increase sales in the longer term.  For instance, Utting (2002) notes that some companies make use of their relationships with the United Nations to boost their image, while ‘in return for having done little to improve their social and environmental performance’ (p16). 

Martens (2007) also points out self-interest is the driving force of big corporations. By joining MSIs, trans-national corporations have a clearer picture of what issues have been discussed. This may help them gain access to governments and safeguard their supply of raw materials in the longer term. Not only can their participation maintain long-term business continuity and stability, but it also helps them create and discover new markets (van Huijstee, 2012). Most MSIs champion a ‘non-state solution’, and big corporations would consider MSIs as a way to improve operational efficiency because they avoid regulations by the state. 

2.1 Mechanisms to manipulate MSIs 

Literature points out five mechanisms that trans-national corporations succeed in hijacking MSIs; they are: information asymmetry, resource and capacity differential, strategic partnership, politics of inclusion and exclusion, and dilemmas of consensus-seeking. 

Big corporations are accused of refusing to disclose full information for verification and monitoring (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001). Making excuses, such as commercial confidentiality, data sensitivity and reducing competitiveness, big companies suppress or distort information, such as the locations of the supplier factories, or refuse to allow monitors to conduct inspections. Without solid evidence, campaigners find it hard to force influential enterprises to change their business practices. To be fair, van Huijstee (2012) is uncertain about the genuine motivations for their refusal to disclose information: ‘whether the company is consciously delaying the process or whether the attitude is explained by a wider business dilemma’ (p48). It is, however, clear to Soreide and Truex (2011) that, without effective laws to ensure free access to information, making a challenge to information asymmetry is very difficult. 

MSIs are not a level playing field. How much different stakeholders can influence the outcomes of MSIs hinges on their capacities, networks and knowledge. The differentials of resources and capacity between trans-national corporations and other non-market players enable the former to gain an upper hand (WWF, 2010). Effective participation in MSIs requires deep knowledge about particular markets and sectors. Business companies, equipped expert knowledge of the market and the problems at hand, enhance their authority in making suggestions and overshadow other stakeholders’ contributions. Similarly, to make their voice louder, trans-national corporations develop strategic partnerships with other actors, such as governments. Collaboration enables them to dominate the process of negotiation, but Soreide and Truex (2011) warn that: ‘the multi-stakeholder group is reduced to an alibi for one category of players’, and that ‘facilitates a continuation of the status quo, including corrupt practices’ (p11-12).  

In theory, MSIs, as an inclusive form of deliberative democratic arrangement, welcome a plurality of knowledge and perspective. Yet, what knowledge and discourses are considered legitimate in the process of stakeholder dialogue is related to the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Cheyns (2010) complains that the technical speak in MSIs excludes certain forms of knowledge, such as indigenous knowledge of local farmers. Additionally, the request for full consent is sometimes compromised, owing to increasing pressure to formulate standards and codes of conduct in order to get visible results. To save time, business corporations may concentrate on short-term technical solutions, rather than tackling long-term structural issues (Martens, 2007). For instance, instead of touching on thorny issues, such as land ownership and gender, companies may simply make proposals to expand land farms or increase farm productivity. In addition, the focus on consensus-seeking also offers big companies an excuse to accuse trade unions or NGOs of being radical and trouble-making (Faysse, 2006).  

3 Seven strategies to re-draw balance of power 

In response to the power inequalities, re-drawing the balance of power within MSIs has become a priority. Based on an assumption that the domination of the trans-national corporations is a result of governance deficits, reforming existing institutional arrangements by making the roles and objectives of MSIs clearer is crucial to ‘improve the quality of standard-setting, reporting, auditing, monitoring and verification procedures’ (Utting, 2002:13). The proposals to reform the governance of MSIs have two objectives: firstly, to make trans-national corporations more accountable by reducing their influence in MSIs; secondly, to enhance the decision-making power of other stakeholders to achieve fairer representation. The seven strategies to achieve these two goals are summarised in Table 1. 


	             Table 1: Seven ‘anti-firm’ proposals 

To formalise monitoring toolsTo enhance evaluation capacity To improve complaint-based systems To engage facilitators and convenorsTo use both carrots and sticksTo build strategic alliances among non-market stakeholders To better engage in public campaigns 

	              (source: compilation by author) 


Reforming existing monitoring systems has received greater attention. Without effective performance reporting and disclosure, Brown (2007) stresses that: ‘no MSI can demonstrate that it is achieving its aim’ (p20). Formalising monitoring mechanisms to replace former voluntary monitoring practices is believed to fill monitoring loopholes to avoid abuse. According to Pieth (2006), formalising monitoring mechanisms can ‘be based on self- or mutual evaluation by group members’ or ‘independent third party monitoring (p14). To strengthen monitoring capacity, WWF (2010) proposes to create and implement ‘Monitoring and Evaluation Metrics’ at the beginning of MSIs, so that benchmarking data are regularly obtained for comparison. 

Independent monitoring and better coordination are crucial to make firms more accountable. O’Rourke (2006) explains that: ‘Independent investigations help to expose the worst actors, provide information to workers, and create incentives to brands to prevent problems in their contractors’ (p911). To achieve this, enhancing staff capacity by better training and strengthening impact assessment are the key. 

Utting (2007) suggests that there is a need to change existing complaint-based systems. Instead of trying to ‘monitor and overhaul a broad array of corporate practices’, he suggests ‘focusing on detecting and addressing abuses of corporate power and breaches of agreed standards’ (p27). It can simply be conducted by an ombudsperson, proposed by Martens (2007). Alternatively, the evaluation of compliance on complaints is heard by a tribunal, which has the authority to impose sanctions. 

Using independent facilitators and convenors or engaging a ‘neutral broker’ can be effective in monitoring stakeholder participation. WWF (2010) believes that this helps avoid stakeholders being ‘too close to the issues to facilitate the process themselves’ (p20). According to the World Bank, an honest, skilled broker who is ‘willing to lead troubleshooting’ is the ideal facilitator (World Bank website). 

Imposing stronger sanctions is considered useful in deterring any non-compliance. The World Bank, for instance, has set up the World Bank Sanctions Board to challenging firms engaged in fraud and corruption in the Bank-financed projects. Between 1999 and 2011, 530 firms have been sanctioned (see www.worldbank.org/sanctions (​http:​/​​/​www.worldbank.org​/​sanctions​)). Similarly, Platteau and Daspart (2003) propose ‘leader-disciplining mechanisms’ to sanction rent-seeking behaviour of local elites. They explain that the disciplinary mechanisms should ‘involve the possibility of detecting embezzlements and punishing the leaders in the event of a proven fraud’ (p1691). However, using penalties as coercive measures can scarce off big corporations. van Huijstee (2012) suggests that using ‘carrots and sticks’ skilfully can offer better incentives for compliance. Instead of using the ‘naming and shaming’ tactic, he explains that naming and praising can be an alternative: ‘Just to companies need to be disciplined when lagging behind, they may be rewarded when performing particularly well’ (p48). He also argues that informal, social sanction is often useful in shaping desirable behaviour.

Another strategy to challenge the domination of the market stakeholders is to build strategic alliances between non-market stakeholders, such as NGOs and unions. More resources are needed to support the weaker stakeholders in order to make their participation more effective. For example, by engaging the non-market stakeholders in technical training, Faysse (2006) argues that this will sharpen their initiative-related focus. O’Rourke (2006) encourages setting up explicit systems for transferring more, and better, information among local stakeholders, trade unions and NGO representatives. 

Lastly, developing skills to use social media more effectively is an attempt to engage with a wider general public. Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) suggest that: ‘lobbying efforts are not meant to replace negotiations, but to balance power within negotiation’ (p247). They recommend deploying a variety of tactics, such as media campaigns, peaceful protest and legal challenges to expose misdeed. 

4 Conceptualising the ‘anti-firm’ institutional perspectives

Before evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies in next section, there is a need to unpack the ‘anti-firm’ perspective. Influenced by the institutional thinking, the ‘anti-firm’ perspective has a strong faith in institutions in countering the domination of trans-national corporations. This is best illustrated by the remark of Rodriguez-Garavito (2005): 

‘…… power differentials between trans-national capital and local labour need to be reduced through institutional designs that effectively protect workers’ rights to organise and collectively bargain’ (p211)

The imbalance of power within MSIs, according to this perspective, is an indicator of governance weakness. To address the design errors, incentive mechanisms need to be restructured and authority systems re-built. Imposing stronger sanction and implementing more effective monitoring and evaluation are a few ‘anti-firm’ strategies to increase the costs of rule-breaking, so that individual interests are drawn closer to the collective ones. Empowering the weaker, non-market stakeholders, by giving them a greater voice in decision-making, is an attempt to bring in justice and accountability. 

The significance of this institutional perspective is that: elite capture is not inevitable in MSIs; whether MSIs are vulnerable to the control of trans-national corporations lies in the interactions between three key factors: (1) institutional arrangements, (2) actors, and (3) power relations (see Diagram 1). 
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Diagram 1: The ‘decentralisation-elite-corruption’ nexus 
(source: author’s own diagram)



Institutions are ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) which shape the interactions between actors within MSIs. They are formal organisational arrangements which decide which stakeholders can partake in the discussion and how agenda are set up. Institutions are also ‘socio-cultural practices that give meaning to [the] spaces for the social actors in them’ (Fortin, 2011:11). Institutions are fluid and dynamic. New rule-based systems are built and old values dissipated through dialogue and social learning. 

Elites are defined as persons or groups that exert disproportionate influence over a collective action (Beard and Phakphian, 2012). In the case of MSIs, trans-national corporations make use of the five mechanisms, such as information asymmetry and resource and capacity differentials (mentioned in section 2), to exert their influences in the process of negotiation. 

To conceptualise the relationships between institutions and power, the works by two key theorists, Michel Foucault (1982) and  Pierre Bourdieu (1977), are useful here. Both of them are keen to explain how institutions, defined as cultural rules and social conventions, help challenge, and reinforce, domination. Foucault suggests that institutions are produced and reproduced through interactions between individuals. A process of institutional reproduction, Foucault would argue, enables powerful actors to shape and manipulate the rules of the game to achieve desirable goals. In other words, how effective of the influence of elites depends on the interactions between elites and non-elites. Non-elites may take actions to challenge the authority of elites by joining new networks. Nevertheless, individuals may choose to co-opt with elites, with an expectation to make gains in the process of collaboration. Some may turn a blind eye to elite domination since they feel powerless or inadequate in making any differences. Coining the notion of ‘symbolic power’, Bourdieu suggests that the ruling class draws on cultural symbols and community wisdom to reinforce the legitimacy of their rule. 

Based on their work, Jo Rowland (1997) suggests four inter-dependent dimensions of power: power-over, power-with, power-from-within, and power-to. ‘Power-over’ is a coercive force that makes someone to do things against their wills. ‘Power-with’ emphasises the collective forces, where people cooperate with each other to achieve some outcomes. ‘Power-from-within’ touches on the psychological power in the minds of people. Power-to’ refers to the capacity of individuals to take action. 

Facing the domination of trans-national corporations in MSIs, using stronger sanction and more effective verification can be seen as ‘power-over’ since they are intended to undermine the authority of big corporations. Individual stakeholders who feel powerless to challenge the domination is considered ‘power-from-within’. Building partnerships among ‘non-market’ stakeholders in the proposal, in contrast, is an evidence of ‘power-with’ because it champions collective power and collaboration. 

5 Effectiveness 

How effective are the ‘anti-firm’ strategies in addressing the power imbalance in MSIs? How useful is the ‘institution-actor-power’ nexus in analysing the complex power dynamics of MSIs? We will tackle these questions in three aspects: (1) practicality and desirability of the proposals; (2) incentive structures of different stakeholders; (3) power issues outside MSIs. 

5.1 Practicality and desirability of the proposals 

The success of the ‘anti-firm’ strategies relies on talented and skilled manpower. Effective monitoring requires independent and perseverant auditors, whilst successful stakeholder exchange needs power-sensitive facilitators and convenors. Rodriguez-Garavito (2005), however, suggests that the existing practice of monitoring in MSIs is dominated by commercial auditors who tend to safeguard the interests of their business clients. Based on their experiences in MSIs, Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) note that, if stakeholder groups are too divided and confrontational, even experienced facilitators may find it difficult to intervene and reconcile the differences.  The ‘best’ persons to monitor the impact of MSIs may be local workers and producers themselves since they have high stakes and they are familiar with local circumstances. Asking local people to work as a ‘spy’, WWF (2010) warns, is a high risk activity. Partaking in monitoring is time-consuming. They may get into trouble if being found out. Most importantly, there is a lack of evidence to indicate if improvement in monitoring would make any real differences to poor people’s livelihoods. 

The technical complexities and the costs of independent verification should not be under-estimated.  Obtaining a broad range of data for monitoring, from health and safety to environment conditions, is time-consuming and expensive. Access to qualitative information, such as the relationships between workers and management and between company and local communities, is even more resource-intensive. 

The effectiveness of sanction in changing the behaviour of trans-national corporations is also questionable. Utting (2002) suggests that people are reluctant to deploy ‘name and shame’ tactics since they find them confrontational which would not be conducive to building harmonious working relationships. Using social media to expose misconduct of business partners is a double-edged sword. While it is effective in causing public embarrassment to rule-breakers, any bad news and scandals about MSIs would leave donors and the general public a bad impression.  

5.2 Incentive structures of different stakeholders 

Defining trans-national corporations as enemies and non-market stakeholders as allies shows a simplistic understanding of power dynamics. The dichotomy of ‘them versus us’ considers power a zero-sum game. Not all trans-national corporations are villains. They may not hide information on purpose in the hope of avoiding any check-and-balance. WWF (2010) defends that it is sometimes multiple layers of ownership that makes systematic information disclosure and inspection difficult. Djama and Daviron (n.m.) also argue that the assumption of an ‘insurmountable divide between firms and NGOs’ is misplaced. In their experiences, quite a few NGOs in MSIs ‘share the corporate belief in the self-regulatory capacity of the market’ (p3). Both sectors require a deep knowledge of managerial and accounting practices. It is not a surprise that some business executives work in NGOs, and vice versa.  

Big corporations succeeding in controlling in MSIs relies on the co-operation of other stakeholders. By collusion with NGOs, O’Rourke (2006) warns that trans-national corporations change the nature of NGOs from ‘watchdogs to partners’ (p907) in order to undermine local laws and trade unions. In order to make better adaptation to the market, NGOs are willing to sacrifice their neutrality by obtaining first-hand information from their business partners. 

Non-market stakeholders are not a homogeneous group. They have divergent interests and incentives. Tension between NGOs and unions exists in many MSIs because they represent different interests. Grouping all non-market members together does not necessarily form a truly inclusive alliance. Not all members have equal resources. The coalition of active members will leave others behind. Without an adequate understanding of the mixed motivations of different stakeholders, how to implement the ‘anti-firm’ policies is problematic. If non-market stakeholders do not share similar values about changing governance structures, forcing them to accept it by using a top-down approach would not make the alliance stronger. 

The majority of consumers do not directly participate in MSIs, but their power is often championed in MSI literature. Rodriguez-Garavito (2005), for example, claims that consumers’ purchasing and investment decisions create incentives for firms to compete for higher standards. However, relying on individual ethical consumers to exert pressure to business, Utting (2002) warns, takes long time to make impact. 

5.3 Sidestepping power inequalities outside MSIs

Targeting trans-national corporations may shift attention of non-market stakeholders from their own legitimacy problems in MSIs. As a result, the pre-occupation with getting the balance of power right within MSIs overlooks three important MSI-related power issues, regarding legitimacy, sector and scale. 

Many NGOs and trade unions are not critical of their role in MSIs because they believe their values are closely aligned with the ideals of MSIs. However, Djama and Daviron (n.m.) finds an interesting phenomenon: no matter what agricultural products are, it is often the same international NGO groups who claim to protect the interests of farmers and to make standards for them. This example, Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) warn, indicates NGOs ‘employing a romanticised or incomplete notion of disadvantaged people to serve their own profession and personal ends’ (p241). While making certification and codes of conduct requires local knowledge, it is paradoxical to note that it is NGOs, not local farmers, who partake in MSIs. 

On surface, MSIs treat all sectors equally. In practice, however, the inherent tension between agricultural and industry sectors is often deliberately hidden in the process of negotiation in MSIs. Owing to the increasing influence of agro-business and neo-liberalism, Cheyns (2010) points out that agricultural sector is often seen as a subordination to industry. When the production of goods is considered more important than food, farmers’ interests are not adequately represented. Complex land-right issues are often side-lined in discussion. 

There is also a growing concern about the widening gap between global and local. When the global networks continue to expand, how local producers contextualise and use the information is a challenge. Rasche (2012) warns that the ‘one-size-fits-all regulatory mentality’ in MSIs contradicts locally-accountable systems of governance, and that further undermines the legitimacy of MSIs. WWF (2010) explains that the widening gap between global and local is owing to the fact that we know very little about the actual impact of standards on local people’s livelihoods. 

The narrow focus on the power inequalities within MSIs has also ignored wider challenges outside MSIs. Effective monitoring, for instance, requires, not only good coordination between different stakeholders, but also strong support of local laws, such as rights to information, to expose abuses. However, increasing pressure to seek consensus and quick-fix solutions with MSIs forces stakeholders to focus on providing short-term answers. Complex structural issues, such as farm subsidies and land rights, are considered beyond the control and scope of MSIs, and thus not properly discussed. 

Lastly, the long-standing North-South unequal power relations deserve more attention. MSIs have been seen as good governance models and have been widely introduced to developing countries. Yet, there are concerns about the Western donors and international NGOs super-impose the governance structures onto poor countries. Lacking bargaining power, Southern governments and NGOs feel tremendous pressure to play with the game. The post-colonial power inequalities between the North and the South remain (van Huijstee, 2012). 

6 Conclusions 

This paper does not deny the domination of trans-national corporations in the negotiation process of MSIs. Neither does it question the good intention and determination of some MSI protagonists in addressing power inequalities embedded in MSIs. Ample evidence has demonstrated the negative impact of the manipulation of big business in the decision-making. Some of their opportunistic behaviour deserves criticisms. 

This paper has, however, expressed our concerns over the over-simplistic ‘anti-firm’ proposals. It has argued that the ‘anti-firm’ perspective is neither desirable, nor effective, in making trans-national corporations more accountable. The problems, this paper has argued, lie in two reasons: firstly, a mistaken faith in using institutional design to re-structure the incentives of stakeholders, and secondly, an inadequate understanding of power dynamics within, and without, MSIs. Targeting big corporations would make them feel threatened. Getting them more isolated would end up more secretive transactions. They may sabotage MSIs by withdrawal or reinforce their control by colluding with other stakeholders. This paper has also warned that creating an unnecessary dichotomy of ‘them vs us’ has diverted NGOs and other stakeholders to discuss other power-related issues, which are equally important to the success of MSIs. 

To move the power agenda forward, we argue that Marten’s notion of ‘elite model of global governance’ (2007) offers a useful framework for analysing power relations of MSIs. Defining elites as people or groups enjoying a disproportionate influence over a collective action, this perspective does not narrowly accuse one or two particular stakeholders of being enemies, but offers greater flexibility in analysing the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Similarly to Schouten et al., (2012), we agree that we need to embrace a more holistic and more radical approach to examining power relationships both within, and without, MSIs. We should not be afraid of exposing inherent tensions of MSIs. Neither should we avoid tackling tough structural issues, such as land rights. Stakeholders should be more critical and reflexive about their own legitimacy and find the ways to bridge international concerns and local effort. It is also crucial to seek a deeper understanding of how standards and codes of conduct make impact on local people’s lives and livelihoods. Additionally, we are aware that MSIs are a generic term. Power dynamics within each MSI are context-specific. We should, therefore, avoid any over-generalisation.   

For practitioners, power may seem abstract, but it influences the effectiveness of MSIs as well as the well-being of people that MSIs intend to achieve. Many NGOs promote public participation and encourage the voice of the poor to be heard in the process of MSIs. To make genuine impact of public participation in MSIs, NGOs should address the institutional barriers that constrain their engagement.  Equally important, gender is one form of power dynamics in MSIs. Utting (2002) points out the dilemma of representation between male-dominated trade unions on the one hand and the interests of female workers on the other. Kabeer (2001) also raises issues about the impact of labour standards on Bangladeshi women who have multiple identities as workers, mothers and wives. Policy makers should articulate the gender politics in the process of MSIs and aim to achieve gender empowerment by raising women’s awareness of the power inequalities within, and outside, MSIs. 
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